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Divine Nature and Human Language: Essays in Philosophical Theology. By 
WILLIAM P . ALSTON. I thaca , N . Y . : Corne l l Univers i ty Press , 
1989. 279 pages . $34 .95 ; $12 .95 (pape r ) . 
Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. By WILLIAM 
P . ALSTON. I t haca , N . Y . : Corne l l Un ive r s i ty Press , 1989. 354 
pages . $44 .95 ; $15 .95 (pape r ) . 
Those familiar with the influence of William Alston on philosophy of 
religion and epistemology will soon recognize the value of these two 
volumes. Both collections of Alston's own essays, they illustrate the con-
sistency of rigor with which Alston tackles philosophical problems, as well 
as the consistency of his position. The first brings together articles, all writ-
ten since 1980, on various aspects of language about God (metaphor, 
literalness, reference), God's nature (foreknowledge, belief, immutability, 
simplicity), and God's relation to the world (morality, spiritual develop-
ment). The second volume of essays, with the earliest piece written in 1971, 
deals with foundationalism, epistemic justification, internalism, exter-
nalism, and self-knowledge. In both works, the introductions help to 
delineate Alston's overall picture of his subjects—God, language, and 
epistemology. 
General features of Alston's positions quickly surface. First, and perhaps 
foremost, is his realism in matters both theological and epistemological. An 
illustration of the former is Alston's commitment to a literal core of meaning 
with regard to talk about God. The latter appears in the externalist aspect 
of his epistemology, namely, that there must be a reliability constraint on 
epistemic principles so that when engaging in our epistemic practices we 
generate mostly true beliefs rather than false ones. A second general feature 
is Alston's antiscientism and antipositivism, illustrated by his willingness 
to take seriously the questions of the skeptic. He is clearly not a Witt-
gensteinian, for although the limits on our epistemic access to the world 
may make us "epistemologically humble ," we still have access. Alston's 
emphasis on the multiple sources of belief and, in particular, religious 
belief, is the third general feature of the works. Influenced here by common 
sense, realist philosopher Reid, and, to some extent, by a nonpositivist 
reading of Wittgenstein, Alston encourages a broad approach to epistemic 
justification, including argument and many types of experience. 
Alston says of his positions in philosophical theology that they take a mid-
dle way. This can easily be extended to both works. Taking neither obscure 
nor radical positions, Alston's writing in both epistemology and 
philosophical theology is commonsensical. Examples from each illustrate 
this point. In Epistemic Justification, Alston argues for an internalist exter-
nalism about epistemic principles. He carefully spells out different kinds 
of internalism: perspectival, accessibility, and consciousness. The first 
claims that what justifies one's beliefs can only be "what is within the sub-
ject 's perspective in the sense of being something the subject knows or 
justifiably believes" (p. 233). The second suggests that what justifies can 
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only be "that to which the subject has cognitive access in some specially 
strong form" (p. 233). The third holds that only "those states of affairs of 
which the subject is actually conscious or aware can serve to justify" 
(p. 233). The first of these conceptions of internalism he rejects, for it relies 
on a deontological account of justification that too strongly assumes that 
we have voluntary control over our beliefs. The third he rejects since it 
requires an infinite regress of justification. The second is Alston's chosen 
position, but even here he proposes a very weak accessibility constraint so 
as to rule out neither beliefs we typically take to be justified nor beliefs we 
typically take to be rational. On the other hand, the externalist aspect of 
his approach claims that "it is both necessary and sufficient [for what con-
stitutes an adequate ground of belief] if the world be such that the ground 
be sufficiently indicative of the truth of the belief, both necessary and suffi-
cient that this actually be the case, and neither necessary nor sufficient that 
the subject have any cognitive grasp of this fact" (p. 244). Thus he combines 
what he takes to be the truth of two quite different positions into a middle 
way. 
In Divine Nature and Human Language, the middle way also emerges in a 
number of instances. Alston argues in the first section that although we can 
make literal claims about God, we cannot do so in such a way that all the 
details are known. For example, in "Functionalism and Theological 
Language," he suggests that "the common possession of abstract features 
is compatible with as great a difference as you like in the way these features 
are realized" (p. 66). Thus , a computer and a new acquaintance can both 
be "intriguing," where the term is used with one sense, but where what 
makes one thing intriguing is quite different from what makes the other so. 
And so with God. God might be able to make something, as we humans 
do, and yet not do so in any way like the way humans do. A second example 
comes from a later essay where Alston compares the Thomistic and Hart-
shornean positions on attributes of God and attempts to keep the best of 
both. Hartshorne rejects the Thomistic proposal altogether, for he reasons 
that this position requires that one understand the attributes to be logically 
interconnected. Breaking the attributes into two groups, Alston argues that 
Hartshorne's arguments linking them are faulty and suggests a "mixed" 
conception of the attributes made up of Thomistic (classical) and Hartshor-
nean (neoclassical) attributes. 
The books may be disappointing to readers outside the fairly narrow con-
straints of contemporary analytic philosophy because of the realist assump-
tions Alston makes. For example, theologians influenced by postmodernist 
considerations will find Alston's emphasis on literal talk of God to be either 
unacceptable, given the relativistic and pluralistic situation in which we find 
ourselves, or simply out of touch with contemporary theology. There may 
also be resistance to Alston's use of the technical terminology of contem-
porary analytic philosophy. Unless one is schooled in the terminology and 
its implicit distinctions and arguments, it may be difficult to see the larger 
painting for the dots of paint. O n the other hand, for analytic philosophers, 
the discussions will not have this weakness. Alston has great breadth of 
knowledge in philosophy and draws on that knowledge to generate a tightly 
reasoned but measured approach to philosophical issues. His commonsen-
sical but important distinctions need to be taken seriously, for they can help 
philosophers avoid certain problems that mark the philosophical map. 
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Philosophers of science, however, may find the works lacking a sensitivity 
to problems and developments in that field. Contemporary analytic 
epistemologists, including Alston, have not, perhaps, taken the findings of 
philosophy of science seriously enough, at least in terms of how those find-
ings impinge on the theory of knowledge. The realism implicit (and explicit) 
in Alston's position is a large commitment for which the actual methodology 
of science may not allow. 
Nevertheless, the two volumes are germane to the discussion of religion 
and science in a number of ways. Note, for example, Alston's comparison 
between the scientist's use of terms in technical yet literal senses and the 
theologian's capacity to do likewise (Divine Nature, p . 45). Also of interest 
is the antipositivistic, antiscientistic approach Alston takes. What does this 
entail for discussions of science and religion? Furthermore, the groundwork 
is laid, in these two collections, for a forthcoming monograph on the percep-
tion of God, in which Alston will be extending his already prolific contri-
butions to that topic. He argues in essays already published but not 
anthologized in the two books being reviewed (see, for example, "Christian 
Experience and Christian Belief, " in Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief 
in God [Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983]), that the 
perception of physical objects and the perception of God are on equal 
footing epistemically. This position is to be further developed in the forth-
coming book. Taken together, these two works and the third to come will 
provide much that is valuable for the discussion of the relationship of science 
and religion. 
In short, these two volumes are well worth reading, even for those whose 
background in analytic philosophy may not be strong, for Alston's insights 
are helpful and his position moderate. Furthermore, the positions he takes 
here have an important role to play in his broader epistemology of religion, 
which is central to contemporary analytic thought on that matter. Alston's 
work should not be ignored. 
M A R K S. M C L E O D 
Assistant Professor of Philosophy 
The University of Texas at San Antonio 
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